The United States and its partners in the war on terrorism have respond ed to the terrorist attacks with a three-pronged strategy -short run military, medium term aid to vulnerable countries and groups, and longer term assistance programs that directly focus on !he sources of terrorist motivation. Using Pakistan as a case study, it appears that the best way to imple· ment the medium and longer term phases are assistance for education reform in the medium term, with the focus on institutional reform, and governance strengthening in the longer term. In most cases, grants are superior to aid in assuring effective and efficient implementation of the country's assistance related programs.
Introduction
In the Autumn of 2001, as United States troops launched their attack on Afghanistan's ruling Taliban, a battle of an entirely different sort was being planned in Washington. This campaign did not receive as much attention, but it was no less important, because it involved winning new allies in the war on terrorism with humanitarian relief for millions of refugees, and financial assistance for eradicating poverty through higher rates of economic growth in key regional countries.
The events of September 11 made it painfully clear that the political, social and economic problems of other countries have a direct impact on American national security. The United States was attacked by a terrorist organization that in large part has had great success in recruiting new members in nations which offer young men little political voice and limited economic opportunity. 
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With this in mind the United States and its coalition partners have responded to the terrorist attacks with a three-pronged strategyshort run military, medium term aid to vulnerable countries and groups and longer term assistance programs that directly focus on the sources of terrorist motivation .. The first task has been generally successfully completed while the seco.nd is only, in 'the initial stages of implementation. In all likelihood however these initi.al successes must also carry to the second and third medium-to longer-term strategies to assure the ultimate defeat of{\! Qaeda and like-minded groups.
Initial Aid Response
Prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Administration;s top foreign aid initiatives for the·2002 fiscal year had been combating the spread .of HIV/J\IDS .and.. othel'illf'ectious diseases, fighting poverty, broadening tjie public/private partn~rship .in aid programming, and expanding the counter~narcotics campaign in the Andean region. With· the; focus :now on anti-Terrorism measures, these issues have bad much less of a priority. ;. . A .main concern from the 'beginning was Pakistan which borders Afghanistan's entire southern rim and contains critical access routes to the country. Virtually all US aid to the country had been cut off after the Pakistanis revealed they had conducted nuclear. weapons tests in 1998. · ··'lb enlist Pakistan's assistance in fighting terrorism, the Bush administration asked (September 22) Congress for blanket authority to wave economic ~anctions against countries whose help is needed in the anti~terror coalition .. Congress quickly granted a limited form of such ·authority .. Four.· days . l!;lter the International Monetary . Fund, where the US.has the largest share of votes,.approved a $135 million loan for Pakistan even though the country was inarrears on servicing its $37 billion national debt. The Treasury .Department then announced it would ease. terms on $379. million .of Pakistan's debt .to the United States, setting the stage for other nations to follow. ,· · , .
On October.15 in Islamabad, the United.States.announced that it would provide $600 millipn in aid to the country in fiscal year 2002, a figure that later rose to $673 .million. On.November. l01il?resident Bush said that long-term aid for Pakistan <;ould total as much as one billion dollars. In this resolution the Senate noted that:
(1) United States foreign assistance programs 'should play an increased role in the global fight against terrorism to complement the natural security objectives of the United States; (2) The United States should lead coordinated international efforts to provide increased financial assistance to countries with impoverished and disadvantaged populations that are the breeding grounds for terrorism; (3) Consistent with United States foreign policy, economic incentives should be used to end state support or tolerance for terrorism; and (4) The United States Agency for International Development and the Department of Agriculture should substantially increase humanitarian, economic development, and agricultural assistance to foster international peace and stability and the promotion of human rights.
In short, the US foreign assistance is enjoying a new lease on life as it is being looked upon by the Administration as an effective, highly visible tool in the early days of the anti-terrorism campaign. Today, the schools are funded both by private donations from Middle Eastern countries and by the "zakat, ~ a 2.5 percent tax collected by the Pakistani government from the bank accounts of Sunni Muslims once a year. The tax results in millio:i;is of dollars each year are directed to. the schools. Foreign donations come mainly from rich individuals and Islamic charities in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States.
A major reason for the popularity of the Madrassahs in Pakistan is that the country's public school system is in a shambles, and many families cannot afford the small fees that are charged. Madrassahs offer an attractive alternative: free education, free meals, free schoolbooks and even in some cases a stipend. While the exact numbers are unobtainable, estimates are that over a million and a half students study at more than 10,000 of these schools. ·'
A number -probably a significant fraction -of these schools have built extremely close ties with radical militant groups. In this capacity they have increasingly played a critical role in sustaining the inter-. national terrorist network. In addition to their role in terrorism, the schools are a concern because of their non-technical, non-scientific curriculum. Many teach only religious subjects to their students, focusing on rote memorization of Arabic texts. In essence they are producing a generation of students unlikely to play a productive role in creating the type of modern dynamic economy necessary to reduce the country's grinding poverty.
Educational Reform
For its part the government is trying to revamp the country's school system, together with weeding out extremist Islamic educators. To this end, on June 19, 2002 the federal cabinet approved the Madrassah Registration Ordinance 2002, in force immediately, to regulate religious schools by bringing them under the formal educational system of the country. According to the ordinance, Madrassahs must register with the Pakistan Madrassah Education Board and the respective Provincial Madrassah Education Boards. A key aspect of the Ordinance is that unregistered Madrassahs will be prohibited from receiving Zakat funds, financial assistance, grants, donations or other benefits from the federal go~ernment or provincial governments. Madrassahs violating the Ordinance risk closure or a tine or both.
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The government is also trying to persuade the schools to teach science, mathematics, English and Urdu. This would provide students with the option, now usually lacking, of eventually enrolling in professional schools. The government has gone so far as to suggest that Madrassahs would receive government aid only if they begin providing what could be termed a "modern education".
According to the Ordinance every registered Madrassah is to maintain accounts and submit an animal report to their provincial education board. A registered Madrassah must not receive any grant, donation or aid from any foreign sources, or allow admission to foreign students or make appointment of teachers without a valid visa and a "No Objection Certificate" from the Interior Ministry.
The country's Madrassah plan is ambjtious and very necessary. But by itself it will take years before the effects start to show. It is already apparent that change will not come soon to the Madrassahs. Not only are many religiou$ groups violently opposed to any government interference, but the Ordinance is not compulsory. In practice, because of pressure from· the clergy, the only penalty for not registering a Madrassah is that it will not be eligible to receive any government funding. Even this limited incentive is undercut by the fact that most of the schools receive little or no government funding to begin with. In August of 2002 after intensive lobbying by clergy leaders, the Musharraf Administration has pledged to water down the Ordinance.
Given the limited reforms likely in the Madrassahs in the near future, the United States and other donor countries should seriously consider using foreign aid and assistance to facilitate educational reform in Pakistan. As a start, the United States provided nearly $35 million in 2002 to bolster the country's state school system. Now, the critical questions involve the most effective and efficient ways to proceed.
Singer has explored several of the options that might be worth considering. Logically, the United States could help the Pakistani government with one or more of the following options:
• Developing a public Madrassah system as an alternative to the current private ¥adrassahs.
• Developing a secular public educatiOn system that provides Pakistani families -with a superior ~lternative to .the Madrassahs. ,.
'
• Developing alternatives and supplements outside the formal educational system
• Obtaining educational aid from a variety of international sources.
Option 1, given the country's limited supply of educational facilities and qualified teachers, might appear to be an attractive short term solution. As Singer notes, publicly managed Madrassahs exist throughout the Middle East, teaching the tenets of Islam, but also providing a more modern curriculum. The United States could help in this effort, but should do nothing to imply direct American influence over the schools, which would discredit their Muslim credentials. Here, US aid should focus mainly on providing various educational materials and supplies. A major problem is that the schools would be hard to monitor for performance, and given the constraints on the role that the United States could play here, this may not be the best avenue through which to focus US .efforts.
Option 2 would definitely entail considerable US aid and assistance. However, rough co~t calculations iri'dicate that this might be a promising option. Estimates are that the United States could build a school for several hundred children for $60,000 and operate it for $10,000 a year. This would appear to be an extremely cost effective alternative.
A final alternative noted by Singer, Option 3, would largely involve expanded American sponsorship of technical schools and other centers of learning within Pakistan. No doubt this would be a popular alternative for many students. As the government's economic reforms begin to bear fruit the demand for trained and skilled graduates will grow rapidly. More importantly, without a steady stream of qualified graduates, the country would have a hard time restoring growth in the 5-6% per annum range.
With regard to Option 4, many other international organizations are prepared to assist Pakistan's attempts at improving public education. The problem is that often the country does not meet all the conditions to qualify for this assistance. For example, the World Bank has recently named Pakistan and 22 other developing nations in Asia, Africa and Latin America to spearhead a campaign to educate all children by 2015. Unfortunately Pakistan, together with India, Bangladesh, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Nigeria, currently falls short of the Bank's minimum criteria for receiving financial aid. The Bank has set two requirements for countries seeking financing: they must have a fully developed "poverty reduction strategy"; and they must be effectively implementing ~,education pl~·
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Vol. 10 & 11 that donor nations have agreed to. As part of its relationship with the IMF, Pakistan currently has a poverty reduction strategy in place. The US contribution could be useful in helping the Pakistani government develop a comprehensive educational plan that could draw financing not just from the World Bank but also from other international agencies and NGOs.
Educational reform will be one of Pakistan's most important challenges in the months and years ahead. Fortunately, the country has a number of viable options for moving away from the current dysfunctional system. Pakistan's progress in this area may be the most critical determinant of whether the country becomes a moderate, progressive nation joining the world community, or whether it descends into increased poverty, isolation, and instability.
Longer Term Aid Strategy for Pakistan
Clearly the Madrassahs are a breeding ground of militant Islam in Pakistan making educational assistance a top priority. With regard to other types of aid for Pakistan, the situation is not as obvious. Burki (2002) notes that the important question is not what kind of presence Al Qaeda has established in Pakistan. 'The real issue is how some segments of society can be weaned away from the type of thinking represented by Al Qaeda. Unless that is done, Pakistan will not be able to achieve either economic or political stability.' At issue then is on what objectives should aid be focused? Does terrorism breed in an environment of dire poverty as is now quite prevalent in Pakistan? Or is it more likely to take hold in an environment of dashed expectations and limited opportunity of economic success for not only the common man, but the educated as well? -an environment that characterizes the plight of many Pakistanis.
Root Causes of Terrorism
As for the underlying causes of terrorism, initial post-9/11 speculation focused on poverty and low educational attainment as critical elements. With time and more rigorous research a different picture has emerged. Krueger and Maleckova's (2002) detailed and in-depth review of the evidence, on the other hand, provides little reason for optimism that a reduction in poverty or an increase in educational attainment, by themselves, -would meaningfully reduce international terrorism. Their main finding is that any connection between poverty, low educational attainment, and terrorism is indirect, complicated, and probably quite weak. Instead of viewing terrorism as a direct Looney, Foreign 
Economic Constraints
Clearly many of these frustrations are playing out in Pakistan as many in that country have grown frustrated with the inability of the country's political leaders to build and maintain an economic system capable of sustaining respectable rates of ec,,onomic growth.
Historically, Pakistan grew faster than the South Asi(l average by an 7
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Vol. 10 & 11 average of two percent in the 1960s and 1970s, and at similar rates through the 1980s. Since 1993, Pakistan's groWth has been below the regional average. In contrast, after ·starting slowly, growth in South Asia as a whole has been steadily accelerating for the four decades (Looney, 2001) . In short, with the exception of a spurt in the 1980s, trends in growth in Pakistan have been steadily slowing from initially very high levels since the 1960s. ·.At that tjme, many observers thought the country had taken off in the Rostow (1960) sense -indus~ trialization was proceeding rapidly and the agricultural sector was experiencing a revolution in productivity gains. To a lesser extent, the 1980s also represents a failed take-off.
William Easterly (2001) has. termed Pakistan's experience as an illustration ()f a 'growth without development' phenomena. Easterly's main point is that the country's poor social indicators have lowered the productive potential economy and its ability to service its high debt .. His observations are suggestive , of possible explanations for Pakistan's failed take-offs, together with a fairly respectable overall growth rate of 5.4% 9ver the 1961-2001 period. It may be that a certain degree. of development and growth was attainable with .. skilled managerial elite and ,unskilled workers, but over time, this strategy ran into diminishing returl),s, as human capital did not grow at the same rate as the other factors. While not definitive,' this explanation is consistent with the slowdown in growth from the late 1980s to the present.
• Along these lil\es, Shahid Husain (2001) • There has been a continuous redistribution of wealth in favour of privileged groups.
• A hard crust of economic monopoly has stifled new growth and creativity.
• An erosion in the provision of public services has resulted in a decline of the· !public's trust ·in government. which is seen as predatory. This, in turn; is linked to non-payment of taxes, the corruption in tax administration, and the massive increase in borrowing. · ' .; ·
• The quality of the civil bureaucracy is falling rapidly. A majority of civil servants., are not even paid a living wage and this is tantamount to an incentive to corruption. • The irrelevance of the state in the lives of the people is exemplified by the total breakdown of law and order.
• The inability and unwillingness of the state to discharge its social services has meant a vacuum in social services. Pakistan's literacy rate has remained almost unchanged since Independence. The dependence on madrassahs is hence understandable.
From this, Hasain correctly concludes that little economic progress, let alone a take-off, can be made in the country until the government is able to re-establish its presence in the political, social, and economic lives of the people.
These patterns of failed take-off, failed government economic management and long run decline suggest that Pakistan is a classic example of a couhtry fulfilling Krueger and Male'ckova's description of a terrorist breeding ground. Clearly, large segments of the population have become weary and frustrated with the country's lack of economic progress, especially now that the Indian economy is pulling away with a much higher and accelerating rate of growth.
Implications for United States Aid
While the analysis above makes a strong case for Pakistan's terrorism problems being an outgrowth of widespread frustration over the country's economic failures and lack of opportunity and economic freedom (Looney, 1997) , the two other commonly cited sources of terrorism, poverty and the militant Islam, noted in the section on education are no doubt also contributing factors and need to be addressed. However, it is unlikely that focusing on them exclusively will significantly reduce the seeming attractiveness of terrorism.
Instead, assistance needs to focus on the policy changes and institution-building needed to put the economy on a high growth path. Here, United States aid can make a significant contribution by assisting the government attack the root causes of terrorism -those elements that define the diversionary economy and currently suppress economic freedom. In targeting these areas (Figure 1) , contributions (dotted lines in Figure 1 ) toward reducing poverty and the numbers of Islamic militants would occur simultaneously.
.
.!~]
:<\ §' • : .' ' .· Ordinary aid towards institution building, anti-corruption and the like· might ·face:· strong domestic obstacles/-However; · in Pakistan's case, the· Musharraf:anti-corruption · and jnstitutional strengthening reforms are'already in place and are appropriate for the war against terrorism'~ they ,;simply -need to . be adequately , funded and· imple: m.e!\ted. ~·a tesult; ,the :United States woµld not' be perceived a:s try~ ing to. impose a foreign set ofinstitutions on the countcy; 1The' overall guideline for allocating assistance should be.simple and direct: is this progr1;1.m assisting the country in moving tOwards' a choice based ·sys~ tem?
. . . . .
-
This approach is 8.lso consistent with the objectives 'laid out in the country's new Five·Year:Plan to raise the GDP growth rate tO 6 percent by' June 30, 2005· (Naqvi, 2003) . To achieve this the government has targeted six key areas: (1) political stability; (2) regional stability; (3) a better law and order situatio11; ( 4) i the continuance of fiscal responsibility;._ tfght control over budget deficits; (5) ·economic policies have tO remain consistent and transparent; and · ( 6) the ·structural reforms program must actually be adhered to and co~pleted .
.. · J.
• .. · ; _ .,:· ' . : . --. The Bush.Administration. is. already moving. in these directions. In addition to its growing preference .for 'grants, the President's recent speech at.the United Nations March 2002 conference on financing for development in Monterrey, Mexico, emphasized the importance of sound economic policies and the encouragement of enterprise. He promised that countries which adopt the right policies will get more aid from the United States.
For the type of institutional loans under consideration here, the situation is more complicated because output is harder to measure and there would be no real 'scope for ¢0mpetitive bids to provide the contracted outputs. Traditional aid often' failed in ' th~se situations because there·wa:s noDiearis to enforce penfilties for failure to perform and often no real incentives on the part of the recipient country to continue or even start the reform process. One alternative in the current context would be to make short-term ~onces'sfonal loaris conditional on institutional rerotm.: Progress (a~ judged by annual ,independent audit) could be rewarded with an extension of the. cocessional loan. Poor implementation would trigger immediate .rep~yment. Because the grant element of a concessional loan mcreases as the loan's matunty increases, the Pakistalii government w.oUid have a real incentive to follow through to successful implementation. As an added incentive a clause could be included converting the concessional loan into a grant upon successful completion of the reform.
Conclusions
Clearly military actions together with foreign aid/grant programs provide an effective start to abating the Al Queda threat. It is clear, however, that the ultimate defeat of Al Queda and similar groups will require the elimination of the appeal of terrorist motivation to potential adherents. Fighting the sources of terrorist motivation will call for comprehensive international cooperation in support of long-term political, economic and social programs in many Middle Eastern countries and Pakistan aimed at affecting and modifying the values and convictions which have motivated the suicide bombers and at drying up the support for al Qaeda and similar organizations. Aid can play 1a P11mc111r1nr11id1
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